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ABSTRACT
In both legal and political settings there has been a push toward
adopting institutions that encourage consensus. The key feature of these
institutions is that they bring interested parties together to communicate
with each other. Existing research about the success or failure of
particular institutions is ambiguous. Therefore, we turn our attention to
understanding the general conditions when consensus is achievable, and
we test experimentally three crucial factors that affect a group's ability to
achieve consensus: (1) the difficulty of the problem, (2) the costs of
communication, and (3) the structure of communication. Using multiple
experimental approaches, we find that difficult problems impede
consensus, costs make consensus less likely (even relatively very small
costs), and the structure of communication has significant effects and
interacts with both problem difficulty and costs. In particular, the structure
of communication can reduce the negative effect of costs and facilitate
consensus. Together these results imply that consensus is only likely to
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occur if problems are easy, costs to communicate are low, or the
communication structure helps overcome the other two problems. These
findings can provide insight about the institutional designs that can be
utilized to promote consensual outcomes.
I. INTRODUCTION
There has been a tremendous push in modem democracy to establish
procedures that lead to more consensual lawmaking. One prominent
example of this movement in modem democracy is negotiated rulemaking
(or "regneg"), which is defined as "a consensus-based process in which a
proposed rule is initially developed by a committee composed of
representatives of all those interests that will be affected by the rule,
including those interests represented by the rulemaking agency."' The
Administrative Conference of the United States highlighted negotiated
rulemaking as a method of lawmaking that could allow affected parties to
have input in the legislative process.2 The negotiated rulemaking procedure
has been praised in many respects:
This technique permits affected interests to retain greater control over the
content of agency rules, while ensuring fairness and balance. It also
permits agencies to obtain a more accurate perception of the costs and
benefits of policy alternatives than can be obtained from digesting
voluminous records of testimonial and documentary evidence presented
in adversarial hearings.3
This quote implies the following about negotiated rulemaking:
(1) The agency itself has a built-in set of "fire-alarms" that prevent
shirking;4
1. CTR. FOR PUB. POLICY DISPUTE RESOLUTION, UNIV. OF TEX. SCH. OF LAW, TEXAS
NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING DESKBOOK 11 (Pub. Res. Series No. 1, 1996), available at
http://www.utexas.edu/law/centers/cppdr/resources/publications/Texas%20Negotiated%20Rulemaking
%20Deskbook%20web.pdf.
2. See 5 U.S.C. § 561 (2006) ("The purpose of this subchapter is to establish a framework for
the conduct of negotiated rulemaking . .. to encourage agencies to use the process when it enhances the
informal rulemaking process.").
3. Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Negotiated Rulemaking and Administrative Law, 38 ADMIN. L. REV.
471, 471-72 (1986).
4. See Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked:
Police Patrols and Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SC. 165, 166 (1984) (defining "fire-alarm oversight" as
"establish[ing] a system of rules, procedures, and informal practices that enable individual citizens and
organized interest groups to examine administrative decisions (sometimes in prospect), to charge
executive agencies with violating congressional goals, and to seek remedies from agencies, courts, and
Congress itself").
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(2) Those affected by the policy are better off since legislation
accounts for multiple points of view;
(3) Negotiated rulemaking strips away unnecessary information
without removing that which is useful or relevant; and
(4) Agencies operating under these conditions can be put on autopilot
to the point at which congressional intervention is all but unnecessary.f
At the core of these arguments is the notion of achieving consensus
from communication. Those involved in negotiated rulemaking, as the
name implies, must negotiate over the proper course of action to take.6 The
instinct underpinning negotiated rulemaking is that allowing the relevant
parties to communicate will lead to both agreement among the actors and
better decisions.' Some have argued that negotiated rulemaking is
successful at achieving this outcome,8 while others have argued that
negotiated rulemaking is slow and thus infeasible as a lawmaking
procedure.9 Cary Coglianese, for example, argues that negotiated
rulemaking does not reduce either the amount of time spent crafting
legislation or the amount of litigation following a law's imposition.' 0
Coglianese states, "Although this quest for consensus has held out the
promise of a faster and less conflictual regulatory process, experience has
5. Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger C. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Administrative Procedures as
Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243, 269-271 (1987) (using the FCC's broad
regulation of the cable industry to demonstrate "how the administrative process keeps an agency in
compliance with the preferences of political officials despite a vague mandate").
6. See Thomas C. Beierle, Discussing the Rules: Electronic Rulemaking and Democratic
Deliberation 9 (Res, for the Future, Discussion Paper No. 03-22, 2003), available at
http://www.rff.org/rff/ Documents/RFF-DP-03-2.pdf (demonstrating how administrative agencies have
attempted to use electronic rulemaking to encourage greater public participation and to shift
"participants from individual opinion to group choices and plans of action").
7. USDA, AGRIC. MKTG. SERV., WHAT IS NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING? 3, available at
http://www.ams.usda.gov/AMSvl.0/getfile?dDocName=STELPRDC5089434 (last visited Apr. 21,
2013).
8. See Philip J. Harter, Assessing the Assessors: The Actual Performance of Negotiated
Rulemaking, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 32, 33 (2000) ("[P]articipants in negotiated rulemaking have found a
range of positive values in the process and that, when implemented in appropriate situations, it has been
remarkably successful in fulfilling its promise.").
9. See, e.g., Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Performance of
Negotiated Rulemaking, 46 DUKE L.J. 1255, 1335 (1997) ("[N]egotiated rulemaking has not lived up to
its promising potential to save regulatory time or prevent litigation."); Jerry L. Mashaw, Small Things
Like Reasons Are Put in a Jar: Reason and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 70 FORDHAM L.
REv. 17, 23 (2001) ("The insinuation of stake holder negotiation into administrative procedures is often
viewed as a corruption of the administrative process. Agency use of advisory committees or 'regulatory
negotiation' is surrounded by a host of constraints to ensure that the agency remains firmly in control of
the ultimate regulatory product. Moreover, none of these devices reduces the agency's obligation to
explain its decision in instrumentally rational terms.") (footnotes omitted).
10. Coglianese, supra note 9, at 1335.
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
so far shown otherwise."" Negotiated rulemaking establishes a process for
communication among interested parties, but it remains unclear whether, or
under what conditions, communication can lead to consensual outcomes.
Therefore, in this Article we focus on the following question: Under what
conditions can communication lead to consensus?
To shed light on communication and consensus, we present the results
of two different experiments that focus on the conditions under which
groups of people can solve consensus problems. Although there are a huge
number of factors we could examine, we have chosen to fodus on three
factors particularly important to legal and political settings: (1) the costs of
participations or communication; (2) the difficulty of the problem the group
must solve; and (3) the structure of communication among decisionmakers
(that is, who talks to whom, and how communication gets passed
throughout the group). Our results suggest that consensus is most likely
when groups face relatively easy problems or when they can communicate
cheaply. However, our results also indicate that the structure of
communication (who talks to whom) can encourage consensus even when
problems are difficult or communication is costly. We turn now to a brief
discussion of the three factors we study experimentally and then to a
description of the experimental design and results.
II. DIFFICULT PROBLEMS, COSTLY COMMUNICATION, AND
COMMUNICATION STRUCTURE
In settings in which consensus is a desirable outcome, three factors
can affect whether a group will achieve the outcome: (1) the difficulty of
the task facing the group,12 (2) the cost of communicating or taking an
action,' 3 and (3) the structure of communication (who talks to whom).' 4 In
this section we briefly discuss each factor and explain why it might affect
the likelihood of successful consensus.
11. Id
12. This has been considered in our prior research. See Cheryl Boudreau et al., Making Talk
Cheap (and Problems Easy): How Legal and Political Institutions Can Facilitate Consensus, 7 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 868, 869 (2010) "[Wlhen problems are difficult, and communication is most
needed, it will be least likely to occur."). This Article draws heavily from the concepts discussed there.
See id
13. See id. ("(W]hen communication is costless, group members can achieve a consensus about
the correct solution to a problem. However, when there is even a small cost (relative to the potential
benefit) associated with sending information and/or listening, groups are much less likely to reach a
consensus.").
14. See id. ("[L]egal and political institutions can facilitate consensus by making communication
cheap and problems easy.").
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In both of our experimental approaches (described in more detail later)
communication is sparse-basically a simple dichotomous choice that all
subjects in the experiment make."s All subjects are connected to at least
one other subject, and they all have the same goal. The connections
between subjects allow their stated preference to be conveyed to either
everyone else in the group or some subset of all the subjects. The costs
associated with the conveyance of these choices can be varied within the
experiment.' 6 Thus, the settings we focus on are a parsimonious framework
for understanding how idealized communication can affect the ability of a
group to achieve consensus. In neither experiment do we consider
situations in which players lack an incentive to achieve consensus, although
we know this may exist in legal and political settings. Rather, we focus on
the conditions that affect consensus when there is an incentive for all
individuals to agree.'" Our results demonstrate that simply having an
incentive to agree is insufficient to guarantee a consensus outcome.
A. PROBLEM DIFFICULTY
The difficulty of the problem that confronts a group will affect its
ability to solve a consensus problem.' 8 Two common ways problems can
become more difficult are by reducing the number of solutions (the classic
needle-in-the-haystack problem),19 or by making the problem one in which
15. There are many decisions made in legal situations in which the choice space is binary. See,
e.g., Mashaw, supra note 9, at 30 (discussing the Social Security Administration dealing with hard-edge
rules for disability benefits-that is, you are disabled or you are not).
16. The costs of communication can be borne by both "speakers" and "listeners" in this
experiment. It may be similarly difficult for speakers in certain situations to push information through
networks.
17. Political actors often do not have an incentive to reach agreement. For instance, the use of
dilatory tactics exemplifies such instances. In the U.S. Congress, there are many examples of both times
that political actors have an incentive to agree and have an incentive to disagree. The incentive for
agreement within parties is highlighted in the works of Gary Cox and Mathew McCubbins, in which
they develop and test a theory about how members of the majority party often manage to reach
agreement among themselves about public policy. See generally GARY W. COX & MATHEW D.
MCCUBBINS, LEGISLATIVE LEVIATHAN: PARTY GOVERNMENT IN THE HOUSE (2d ed., Cambridge Univ.
Press 2007) (1993); GARY W. COX & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, SETTING THE AGENDA: RESPONSIBLE
PARTY GOVERNMENT IN THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (2005). At the same time, there are
often times when there are incentives for disagreement between the two political parties in the U.S.
Congress. The use of the filibuster in the U.S. Senate represents perhaps the most obvious manifestation
of incentives not to reach agreement. For a review of the history and uses of the filibuster, see generally
GREGORY KOGER, FILIBUSTERING: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF OBSTRUCTION IN THE HOUSE AND
SENATE (2010).
18. Boudreau et al., supra note 12, at 868 ("We also find that difficult problems significantly
reduce group members' willingness to communicate with one another and, therefore, hinder their ability
to reach a consensus.").
19. See Daniel P. Enemark et al., Does More Connectivity Help Groups to Solve Social
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fewer people in the population either know the correct answer or have a
strategy for finding it (that is, can a person tell the difference between the
needle and more hay). 20 Both types of problem difficulty occur in legal and
political situations. For example, there a great many ways and places to
store radioactive waste, and a regulatory body has to identify the best
solutions; however, there may be very few individuals who are competent
to adjudicate if a proposed solution is actually a good one. If it is difficult
to identify the correct answer, it will be harder to achieve consensus than
for a task in which the answers are relatively easy and widely understood.21
In addition to directly manipulating the difficulty of a problem, one way to
indirectly affect the difficulty of finding the correct solution is to change
the decision rule by which groups decide an answer to a problem.22 In
political and legal settings, the decision rules often require either unanimity
or majority for a decision to be reached.23 In our experiments we directly
manipulate both the difficulty of the underlying problem (how many people
know the answer) and the decision rule to understand how these factors
affect group consensus.
B. COSTS TO COMMUNICATE OR TAKE AN ACTION
Costs to communicate can significantly impede both communication
and the likelihood a group achieves consensus on the right answer.24
Problems? 5 (unpublished manuscript) (Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Elec. Commerce, June
2011), available at http://polisci2.ucsd.edu/denemark/papers/enemark-ec_201 1.pdf (demonstrating that
reductions in the number of solutions can severely impede a group's ability to resolve a coordination
problem).
20. See generally Scorr E. PAGE, THE DIFFERENCE: How THE POWER OF DIVERSITY CREATES
BETTER GROUPS, FIRMS, SCHOOLS, AND SOCIETIES (2007) (acknowledging that problem difficulty can
affect solutions and arguing that diversity in groups is useful, because the diversity of individuals makes
it more likely that either someone will know the correct answer or have a strategy to find the correct
answer).
21. We assume here that the solutions to the problems do not have differential payoffs to the
actors. Actors share a common preference in identifying and agreeing on a solution, regardless of which
one it is. If actors also disagree about which solutions should be adopted (or have a different ranking of
their benefits and costs), then the consensus problem will be made more difficult because of conflict
between individuals.
22. See generally Matthew J. Gabel & Charles R. Shipan, A Social Choice Approach to Expert
Consensus Panels, 23 J. HEALTH ECON. 543 (2004). Prior works have shown experimentally that in
decentralized coordination game, the addition of conflict between individuals makes coordination
significantly more difficult. See generally Mathew D. McCubbins, Ramamohan Paturi & Nicholas
Weller, Connected Coordination: Network Structure and Group Coordination, 37 AM. POL. RES. 899.
23. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 16 (requiring unanimous jury verdicts in criminal trials, but
only three-fourths majority jury verdicts in civil trials).
24. See generally Boudreau et al., supra note 12 (presenting experiments that take into account
the costs of communicating and its effects on consensus).
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Essentially, as it becomes more costly to acquire information, fewer people
will choose to listen, which thereby induces fewer people to speak.25 The
result of this process is that costs substantially eliminate communication.
An action's costliness can affect coordination or consensus. For example, it
may be costly to change one's mind about the right answer to a question
(that is, if a defendant is guilty or how to dispose of radioactive waste), or it
could be that achieving consensus requires us to all take the same action
(that is, multiple agencies must agree on how to implement a policy and
implementation is costly). In either situation, the cost can impede
coordination or consensus because if achieving consensus requires that
some actors pay a cost, each actor would prefer that the others pay the cost.
In this environment a successful outcome may be less likely because the
guaranteed cost of taking an action exceeds the expected benefit of
coordination. In essence, a coordination / consensus problem with costly
actions contains elements of both coordination and cooperation and
represents a common political and legal scenario.2 6
C. STRUCTURE OF COMMUNICATION
In a group of decentralized actors there are many different ways to
model the structure of communication-that is, who talks to whom. Prior
work in this vein has demonstrated that costs to communicate can impede
coordination;27 having a group leader can improve coordination28 and the
presence of focal points can encourage coordination. 29 We model the
communication environment using a network.30 In the network model a
25. Id. at 871 ("[E]ven small costs to communicate reduce the likelihood that groups reach a
consensus by making group members less willing to send information and listen to one another about
the correct solutions to various problems.").
26. See id. at 868-69 (describing various legal scenarios in which even minor communication
costs can prevent a consensus from being reached).
27. See id. at 878-85.
28. Rick K. Wilson & Carl M. Rhodes, Leadership and Credibility in N-Person Coordination
Games, 41 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 767, 789 (1997) ("[L]eadership is important for resolving coordination
problems. Leaders can serve as a focal point, helping followers choose one equilibrium from among
several.").
29. See generally THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT (1960) (concluding that
"focal points" could be used to solve coordination games by allowing players to use obvious elements
to come to one equilibrium).
30. We are not the first to use a network to model communication structure. See generally Antoni
Calv6-Armengol, Bargaining Power in Communication Networks, 41 MATHEMATICAL Soc. Sa. 69
(2001) (studying how placing players in a network communication affects their bargaining power);
Syngjoo Choi et al., Network Architecture, Salience, and Coordination, 73 GAMES AND ECON. BEHAV.
76 (2011) (utilizing asymmetric networks to study their effects on strategic delay and strategic
commitment).
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node is an individual / actor and a link represents communication or
information between them. Using a network approach we can model an
arbitrary pattern of information among nodes in a network. An example of
some of the different communication structures that can exist among four
actors is shown in figure 1. In our experiments, a link is undirected and
implies symmetric information (both nodes see each other) along that link,
but in theory, links could be directed (that is, information would be
asymmetric) so that only one node could observe the other node, which
would increase the number of possible communication structures. 31 It is
clear that even with only a small number of nodes and bilateral undirected
links there are many possible communication structures.
FIGURE 1. Possible Information Structures with Four Actors
III. TESTING THE EFFECTS OF PROBLEM DIFFICULTY AND
COSTS TO COMMUNICATE ON CONSENSUS
All of our experiments on consensus in this Article involve several
features: multiple decisionmakers; a state of the world that individuals need
31. The number of possible structures explodes if either of two things happen: (1) links are
directed / asymmetric between nodes; or (2) positions in the network are not equivalent-that is in a
line is the structure simply the connections or also which actors occupy a node. We opt for a simpler
approach in this Article.
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to determine; the opportunity to communicate information about one's
beliefs about the state of the world; the opportunity to receive information
about others' beliefs; and a great incentive for individuals and groups to
reach a consensus. Despite sharing these similarities, our experiments differ
in the communication structure that connects individuals, the task facing
subjects, and the structure of incentives.
In the first experimental design, subjects are tasked with deciding the
correct answer to math problems drawn from an SAT II, level-two math
test.32 We provide two possible answers for each question, one is correct
and the other is incorrect. Subjects have sixty seconds to answer each math
problem. They earn one dollar if their final answer is correct, they lose one
dollar if their final answer is incorrect, and they neither earn nor lose
money if they do not answer the problem. If the group achieves consensus,
each individual makes an additional ten dollars. Consensus requires a
correct answer by either a majority or unanimity (depending on the
condition) of the subjects. This payment structure creates a common
interest among all subjects to reach a consensus about the correct answer.
The use of math problems allows us to focus on the core element of this
experiment-the difficulty of the problem-and its relationship with
successful consensus.
Subjects have the opportunity to exchange information during the
experiment. In the experiment, we break the information process into two
steps: sending information and receiving information. After subjects see the
math question and the two possible answers, they have an opportunity to
choose if they want to send a recommended answer about the problem to
the other subjects. They also choose simultaneously if they would like to
receive any recommended answers to the math problem. After subjects
make these two decisions, the experimenters aggregate the number of
subjects, if any, who suggest answer A or B, and then distribute this
information to the subjects that chose to receive information. Subjects who
chose to receive information will receive a signal that tells them the
number of subjects who recommended each answer. This communication
set up is analogous to the Delphi method and is represented by figure 2
below.33 The figure demonstrates that we can model this structure of
32. Math problems are ideal because we can easily observe whether or not subjects converge to
the correct consensus. In addition, subjects are unlikely to have ideological attachments to the answer
that might make them unwilling to learn from others. For a longer discussion of why math problems are
useful in such experiments, see generally Cheryl Boudreau, Closing the Gap: When Do Cues Eliminate
Differences Between Sophisticated and Unsophisticated Citizens?, 71 J. POL. 964 (2009).
33. The Delphi method is one way to implement the model Morris DeGroot proposed for how a
group could achieve consensus. See Morris H. DeGroot, Reaching a Consensus, 69 J. AM. STAT. ASS'N
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connections between individuals as a network in which each node can
connect to the central node ("Delphi box") at a cost. The core function of
this Delphi box is to assure subject anonymity and to provide information
about the other subjects' choices.34
FIGURE 2. Delphi Mechanism
We do not provide any information in our standard experiment about
the characteristics of those who suggested answers because we do not want
to affect what people know about the group or individuals, as that is not the
118, 120 (1974) (discussing a model that assumes "that there is no possibility of learning whether the
opinion of one individual is closer to the truth than that of another."). The Delphi method has been used
in government and business applications as a way to facilitate consensus among decisionmakers. The
Delphi method has been implemented in a number of different ways, but generally, the technique
involves experts answering survey questions, a central person aggregating the experts' answers and
distributing the aggregated responses to the experts, and then experts again answering all or a subset of
the survey questions. See Gene Rowe & George Wright, The Delphi Technique as a Forecasting Tool:
Issues and Analysis, 15 INT'L J. FORECASTING 353, 353-55 (1999) (describing and reviewing the
Delphi method). This process may then be repeated for some number of iterations, depending on the
actual Delphi method utilized. See id.
34. For more about the Delphi method see generally Rowe & Wright, supra note 33 (reviewing
and critiquing empirical studies of the effectiveness of the Delphi technique); HAROLD SACKMAN,
RAND, DELPHI ASSESSMENT: EXPERT OPINION, FORECASTING, AND GROUP PROCESS (1974), available
at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/reports/2006/RI283.pdf (detailing the origination of and
providing a critical analysis of the Delphi technique).
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focus of the experiment. The significant bonus for consensus creates
conditions of trust among subjects-it encourages only those who know the
correct answer to provide information, and they should only suggest the
correct answer because there is no benefit from deceiving subjects in this
experiment.35 After subjects receive the signal about recommended
answers they must decide how to answer the math question. In the
experiment, subjects do not receive any feedback after each problem about
whether they answered a question correctly or if the group achieved the
bonus. We design the experiment in this fashion to reduce the opportunity
for subjects to learn about the others in the group. We also utilize dividers
between subjects and all actions taking during the experiment are done
anonymously to reduce learning within the experiment. We make each
question as close as possible to a one-shot trial, as in the model. All of the
protocols are read aloud to subjects to ensure common knowledge and
subjects are quizzed on the various instructions throughout the experiment.
A. EFFECTS OF PROBLEM DIFFICULTY AND COSTS TO COMMUNICATE ON
CONSENSUS
Costs to communicate significantly reduce the likelihood of groups
achieving consensus. 36 This effect occurs for two reasons. First, if speaking
is costly, fewer subjects will choose to do so because they may not believe
their choice to speak will lead the group to achieve coordination; therefore
they would pay the cost without receiving a benefit. Second, if listening is
costly, subjects are less likely to listen. This implies that it is less useful for
subjects to suggest an answer because no one is listening so the speech has
no value. These results suggest that consensus may not be easy to achieve
if communication is costly.
In the tables below, we examine the proportion of times that groups of
eight subjects were able to achieve consensus on the correct answer to a
math problem, based on the difficulty level of the problem. These results
combine a variety of different costs for communication, but in all of these
35. See ARTHUR LUPIA & MATHEw D. MCCUBBINs, THE DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA: CAN
CITIZENS LEARN WHAT THEY NEED TO KNow? 184 (1998) ("Specifically, we find that a person's
willingness to follow a speaker's advice depends strongly and regularly on that person's perceptions of
the speaker's knowledge and trustworthiness.") (emphasis omitted); Vincent P. Crawford & Joel Sobel,
Strategic Information Transmission, 50 ECONOMETRICA 1431, 1432 (1982) (arguing that a condition of
mutual welfare between subjects creates an "optimal compromise" in which a sender of information
will only do so in a way to encourage the receiver to respond favorably).
36. See generally Boudreau et al., supra note 12 (considering the difficulty in achieving
consensus when there are costs to communicating).
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trials it was possible for subjects to communicate with one another. We
measured difficulty in a separate set of experiments in which we gave the
math problems to randomly selected undergraduate students and paid them
to solve the problems, for which they earned one dollar for a right answer.
Table I combines the various communication conditions: free, cost to
speak, cost to listen, and cost to speak and listen. It is clear that there is a
considerable effect of the difficulty of a problem on the likelihood a group
reaches consensus on the correct solution. For the easiest problems, groups
almost always reach consensus, but the proportion steadily declines as the
problem difficulty increases, until consensus almost never occurs.
Therefore, even if there is a significant advantage to achieving consensus
and communication is possible, groups may fail to do so if problems are
difficult.
TABLE 1. Effect of Problem Difficulty on Consensus
Problem difficulty (percent Hardest Hard Easier Easiest
ofstudents answering (6-15%) (16-36%) (37-56%) (57-90%)
correctly in pretest)
Successful consensus 2/104 4/42 25/68 43/74
(1.9%) (9.5%) (36.7%) (58.1%)
We also expect that majority rule will lead to an increase in the
probability that a group achieves consensus, compared to unanimity,
because only five subjects must answer correctly instead of all eight. We
test these predictions in tables 2 and 3, in which we examine how changing
from unanimity to majority affects both communication and the ability to
achieve consensus. The results in table 2 demonstrate that majority rule
does not lead more subjects to send or receive information in the
experiment. However, as shown in table 3, we find that majority rule is
associated with a positive, significant increase in the probability that a
group achieves consensus. These two results suggest that this greater
success in achieving consensus is because fewer people must agree under
majority rule and not because individuals are more likely to communicate.
The results in table 3 indicate that both cost to receive and cost to send and
receive are associated with a lower probability of achieving consensus, as
we demonstrated in prior work.37 The cost parameter is insignificant,
suggesting that increasing cost does not decrease the probability of
37. Id.
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consensus; the implication of this is that even a small cost has the same
impact on achieving consensus as a large cost.38 In addition, the results in
both table 2 and table 3 show that easier problems are associated with both
more communication and a higher probability of achieving consensus.
Together, these results demonstrate that changing the decision rule may
lead to greater consensus, but it does not engender greater communication
in the process.
TABLE 2. Majority Rule Does Not Increase Communication
D V. Sending DV. Receiving
information information
Majority rule for consensus 0.87 (0.96) 0.32 (1.33)
Individual SAT math score 0.012 (0.003)** 0.002 (0.002)
GPA -0.41 (0.47) 0.007 (0.35)
Group average SAT math -0.01 (0.02) -0.005 (0.03)
score
Cost to send/receive -0.41 (0.41) -0.95 (0.53)
information
Ease of problem 0.02 (0.008)** -0.01 (0.006)
Constant -3.00 (15.4) 1.94 (20.1)
N 372 372
Note: *= significant at 0.05 level; ** = significant at 0.01 level
Analysis includes only trials conducted in the cost to send and receive condition with eight subjects.
Costs to send and receive information were ten cents, twenty-five cents, one dollar, and two dollars.
Estimation done via a multilevel model with separate intercept for each experimental group.
38. Id. at 878.
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TABLE 3. Majority Rule and Easier Problems Facilitate Consensus
DV: Consensus
Cost for taking an action, either speaking -0.31 (0.63)
or receiving
Pay to send condition, receive for free -0.48 (0.77)
Pay to receive condition, send for free -3.15 (0.94)**
Pay to send and receive condition -2.98 (0.91)**
Group's average SAT math score 0.042 (0.01)**
Group's average GPA -0.07 (1.91)
Ease of problem 0.10 (0.02)**
Majority rule 3.77 (1.44)**
Constant -29.69 (10.8)*
N 258
Number of groups 25
Random Effect Parameter
Group effect 0.84 (0.56)
LR test versus standard logistic regression 0.97
(chi2)
IV. COMMUNICATION STRUCTURE AND COSTLY
COORDINATION
In a separate set of experiments, we have studied how the structure of
communication, modeled as a network, affects group consensus. These
experiments model the network explicitly by treating individuals as nodes.
A link between two nodes allows those nodes, or individuals, to
communicate during the experiment. The task facing subjects in these
experiments is deceptively simple-they must choose a color for their node
that either makes them the same or different than all of their neighbors
(depending on the experiment). If every node in the network successfully
solves their local problem, then the entire group earns a payoff. If nodes are
not connected, those nodes cannot observe each other, and thus do not have
any information about the network other than the number of nodes.
Subjects were recruited from large public and private universities via
email and flyers throughout campus. Interested subjects were then emailed
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to sign up for an experimental session. 39 On the day of the experiment, we
chose sixteen of the people who showed up to participate. The sixteen
subjects were escorted to a computer lab where they sat at computer
terminal with partitions between them to ensure they could not observe
each other's behavior. We read instructions aloud to all the subjects to
describe the game and ensure they understood the game's rules. We also
quizzed the subjects any time we changed the experimental treatment of the
game to ensure they understood the changes. Subjects were always given
two colors to choose from during a trial, but the colors varied for each trial
and for each subject. This was done to make the development of a focal
color difficult. Subjects had three minutes to successfully solve the
coordination task. Once the session began, subjects could make choices at
any time. Choices were immediately visible to those with whom they share
an edge. This makes the game dynamic and asynchronous, not a stage or
single-shot game. If the trial was solved successfully each subject earned
one dollar; however, if choosing a color was costly, the costs were
subtracted from the earnings for that session. If trial was unsuccessful and
the actions were costly, subjects simply lost money for each move.
This experimental framework begins with a basic consensus game in
which all actors try to take the same action. We then modify this by adding
a cost that is imposed each time an actor chooses a color (similar to
communicating about a proposed correct solution to a problem). The
addition of costs creates an element of potential conflict between the
individuals in the game, which is common in legal and political situations.
Imposing costs changes the consensus game as illustrated in the following
two scenarios. First, consider the situation in which no one has taken an
action. If taking an action is costly, players will only pay the cost to take an
initial action if they believe that the group can solve the coordination
problem (which requires all players to pay at least an initial cost to take an
action). If players believe the group cannot reach a solution, then they will
not pay the cost to make an initial choice. If the initial costly choice leads
to consensus, then no one has an incentive to deviate. Second, consider the
situation in which the initial costly choice does not lead to consensus.
Then, at least some players must pay an additional cost to take another
action for consensus to occur. In this scenario each player would prefer if
the other player(s) paid the cost to change color. However, if everyone
waits for someone else to act, then the group will not achieve consensus.
39. The email was sent from one of the researchers to undergraduates at students from public and
private universities in California. The email informed them of an opportunity to take part in an
experiment and to earn money in the process. Further information is on file with the authors.
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The most important point is that the simple addition of costs infuses the
basic consensus game with an element of conflict regarding who will pay
the costs to change color.
In figure 3 we present the modified version of the Delphi mechanism
that functions in these experiments. Every actor is connected to the
computer server (which acts as the Delphi mechanism) to maintain the
anonymity of subjects and to let subjects know how much time remains in a
particular trial. In addition, subjects have direct connections to others in the
network which comprise the communication structure in the experiment.
These connections are displayed in figure 4.40
FIGURE 3. Delphi Mechanism Modified so Subjects Can Directly Observe
Others' Actions
40. The networks used in this set of experiments are displayed in figure 4. The networks differ
in both the total number and structure of communication to allow us to study how both these factors can
influence consensus.
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FIGURE 4. Networks Used in Experiments
Segregation 2 leader disconnected
Mixture 2 leader connected
*0
Star No leader
During the actual experiment, subjects know the following
information, which is displayed in the sample screen shot in figure 5 below:
Number and Degree of Neighbors. Subjects can observe the other
nodes to which they are connected and the color of those nodes at all times.
They also know how many connections each neighbor has, which is
displayed in the center of the node.
Time Elapsed. A bar displays how long until the session expires.
Cost to Move. We implement a cost for each choice a player makes,
including his first choice. The cost per choice is displayed on the screen.
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FIGURE 5. Interface Used During Network Consensus Experiments
7
elapsed time
You will eam $1.00 if everyone color is the same, othervIse $0.0
You will lose $0.2 every time you change colors.
You have changed colors 2 times, costing SO040.
2
2
2
2
2
U = 0
2
0
your color: Ciigra CLiilZ
In addition, subjects can determine if the trial was solved successfully
because, if successful, the trial will end before the time elapsed bar runs
out. They do not know the structure of the entire network at any point
during these experiments. We utilize both within and between subject
designs. During each experimental session (consisting of thirty to fifty
trials), there are different costs to take an action. This allows us to observe,
within a single group, how changes in costs affect coordination. At the
same time, to achieve enough observations, we pool results from
experiments that involved different groups.
A. EFFECTS OF COMMUNICATION STRUCTURE ON COSTLY CONSENSUS
To study communication structure and costly coordination, we have
subjects play a consensus game in which it is costly to choose a color. For
instance, subjects might complete ten trials with no cost to move, twelve
trials with a ten-cent cost, sixteen trials with a thirty-cent cost and sixteen
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trials with a fifty-cent cost. The reason to group trials based on cost is to
ensure that subjects fully understand the costs for each set of trials. We
remind and quiz subjects before we change the cost to move. Given that the
order of the costs may matter, we also vary the order of the trials between
different groups; however, we always begin with the no-cost treatment to
ensure that subjects believe the game is solvable and therefore attend to the
coordination task to earn money. The addition of costs to a consensus game
significantly increases the amount of time it takes for the group to solve the
problem (p < 0.01, two-tailed test). Therefore, there is an overall main
effect of costs on the time it takes for a group to reach agreement about
how to solve this experimental task.
To examine the effect of communication structure on the time it takes
to complete a costly consensus game, we focus on the mixture and no-
leader networks, which feature no variance in degree. The mixture network
has fifty-six edges and the leader network has only twenty-four. Consistent
with this, the mixture network is completed faster than the no-leader
network when we examine all the network trials across the various cost
conditions (two-tailed t-test, p < 0.01). In figure 6 we display the average
time to solve the consensus problem in the mixture and no-leader networks
for each different cost level.4 ' We can see that although costs increase the
time to reach a solution in the mixture network, the increase is much less
than it is in the no-leader network.42 These results clearly suggest that even
when it is very costly to take an action it is possible to create a structure of
communication that facilitates consensus.
41. See supra Figure 4.
42. See supra Figure 4.
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FIGURE 6. More Edges Reduce the Effect of Costs on Consensus
Mixture 
No Leader
C
0
.1011.111I
0 5 10 20 30 50 0 5 10 20 30 50
Cost
Note: Outcome is the average number of milliseconds to achieve coordination among all the trials in
which taking an action was costly. Any failed trials are right-censored at 180,000 milliseconds.
The moderating effect of communication structure on the time to
achieve consensus can provide guidance about the design of institutions,
because it is through institutional design that we often build the structure of
communication in legal and political situations. To put it another way, legal
and political environments are often intentionally designed, which means
that it may be possible to build a structure of communication that
encourages agreement.
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V. CONCLUSION
In a variety of legal settings there is a focus on creating consensus
among affected parties. Scholars are divided on whether or not these
attempts, such as in the case of negotiated rulemaking, will actually lead to
greater agreement. 3 In our experiments, we demonstrate the conditions
under which groups can, in fact, achieve consensus. Our experimental
results conclude that achieving consensus is more likely when the
underlying problem is relatively easy or when it is free (or very cheap) to
take an action or communicate.44 However, in settings in which
communication is costly, our results indicate that the structure of
communication can facilitate or defeat consensus. This last point implies
that institutions that create communication between actors can be a
valuable part of encouraging consensus, even when it is costly to
communicate or take an action.
All our experiments discussed in this Article involve situations in
which the actors have a common interest in solving the problem, even
though they may not agree on how to solve it (that is, who should pay the
costs to reach a solution); therefore, we have intentionally and explicitly
stacked the deck toward finding that consensus is achievable. If individuals
in a group do not have an incentive to agree (or have an incentive to delay a
decision), then it will be more difficult to reach a consensus.4 5
These experimental results have important implications for both
empirical research and the design of legal and political institutions. First,
our results identify three important dimensions that can affect group
consensus, and in so doing provide a path for future research about group
decisionmaking. Additional experiments and observational research can
help clarify and further refine the various ways that problem difficulty,
costs to communicate, and communication structure work to either
facilitate or impede the formation of a consensus. Our results demonstrate
that each factor matters, but there is more work needed to fully understand
how these factors affect outcomes. Second, our results can provide some
guidance about how institutions can be designed to facilitate consensus.
43. Compare Harter, supra note 8, at 33 ("[P]articipants in negotiated rulemaking have found a
range of positive values in the process and that, when implemented in appropriate situations, it has been
remarkably successful in fulfilling its promise."), with Coglianese, supra note 9, at 1335 ("[N]egotiated
rulemaking has not lived up to its promising potential to save regulatory time or prevent litigation.").
44. For further support of this proposition, see generally Boudreau et al., supra note 12.
45. Our prior research provides further communication experiments in which "group members
have an incentive to reach a consensus about the correct solutions to various problems." Id. at 869.
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Institutions have a particular role to play in creating the communication
structure with which decisionmakers interact. This design structure, the
structure of connections between decisionmakers, can go a long way to
establishing the conditions for consensus. However, connections will not
naturally emerge just by putting people into a room and having them make
their cases; instead, a communication network needs to be established, one
that reduces the adverse effects of costly communication and eases the
burden of tough decisions.46
46. Improved communication networks have potential to affect many legal and political
institutions in which consensus in decisionmaking processes is crucial. As our former research
indicates,
In many legal, political, and social settings, people must reach a consensus before particular
outcomes can be achieved. For example, a conviction in U.S. criminal cases requires jurors to
reach a consensus about the guilt of the accused. In the United Nations, the five permanent
members of the Security Council must reach a consensus to issue a resolution. In many
legislatures, agencies, and lower courts, a consensus (or near consensus) is also necessary
when making particular types of decisions. In all these settings, reaching a consensus is
important not only because it is required for producing particular outcomes, but also because
there are often significant costs associated with failing to reach a consensus. Indeed, a jury
that fails to reach a consensus can result in a mistrial, Supreme Court justices who fail to
reach a consensus can produce weak precedent, and legislators who fail to reach a consensus
can face substantial political costs at election time.
Id. at 868-69.
